# **IPSec Overview** AH – Authentication Header – RFC 2402 - provides for integrity protection **IPSec** ESP – Encapsulating Security Payload – RFC 2406 – provides for encryption an/or integrity AH. ESP and IKE IKE – Internet Key Exchange – RFC 2407/8/9 – provides for mutual authentication and a shared secret for security association

# Security Association (SA)

- IPSec SA is a one-way cryptographically protected connection involving
  - cryptographic key
  - cryptographic algorithm
  - security services (e.g. encryption and/or integrity)
  - sequence number and ID of other end
- SPI (security Parameter Index) is field in IP Header which with destination address uniquely identifies SA in database

## Security Association Database

- SA database at transmitter A holds following for B:
  - SPI
  - key
  - algorithm
  - sequence number
- SPI of received packet tells B where to look for above info required to process packet


# Security Policy Database

- Database specifies types of packets
  - to be dropped
  - to be forwarded or accepted under IPSec protection
  - to be forwarded or accepted without IPSec protection
  - to be encrypted or integrity protected
- Policy decision can be made on IP addresses (source or destination), protocol type or IP Header


# Modes in IPSec

- Transport Mode suitable for end to end security
- Tunnel Mode designed for protection over part of path but can be used for entire path
- Tunnel Mode requires additional header
- Firewall to firewall uses tunnel mode


# **Transport Mode**



#### **Tunnel Mode**



# Authentication Header (AH)



# Authentication Header (II)


- Next header specifies what follows e.,g if TCP, Next Header = 6
- Payload length total length of header in 32 bit words – not including first 8 octets
- Sequence number defined by AH (i.e. not TCP sequence number) and protects against replay
- Authentication Data cryptographic identity check on data

## Mutable and Immutable Fields

- Fields which may be changed by routers along path cannot be included in integrity check
- Mutable fields are
  - Type of Service
  - Fragment Offset
  - Time to Live
  - Header Checksum

# ESP Envelope

#### # octets



#### Encapsulating Security Payload (II)

- IV e.g. as in CBC
- Data the data to be protected by encryption or integrity
- Padding to make data a multiple of block size for encryption
- Padding Length number of octets of padding
- Authentication Data cryptographic integrity check zero if encryption only
- NB (i) encryption covers data, padding, padding length and next header, and (ii) integrity covers all from SPI to Next Header

# AH and ESP Comparison

- ESP can provide integrity
- AH protects IP Header, ESP protects only beyond ESP Header
- AH possible more exportable
- AH allows intermediate devices to look at layer 4 ports

#### Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

- ISAKMP Internet Security Association & Key Management Protocol – RFC 2408
- IKE Internet Key Exchange RFC 2409
- DOI Domain of Interpretation RFC 2407

# **IKE** Phases

- Phase 1 provide mutual authentication and establishes session key
- Phase 2 allows for multiple security associations for same Phase 1 pair
- Phase 1 exchange is ISAKMP SA
- ESP/AH SA is Phase 2

## Phase 1 IKE

- Aggressive Mode 3 messages used for mutual authentication and establishing session key
- Main Mode uses 6 messages for above but has endpoint identifier hiding and can negotiate cryptographic parameters

#### Phase 1 EKE Aggressive Mode

g<sup>a</sup> mod p, A, crypto proposal

A  $g^{b}$  mod p, crypto choice, proof I'm B B

proof I'm A

## Phase 1 IKE Main Mode

	crypto suites I support	
	crypto suites I choose	
A	g <sup>a</sup> mod p	
	g <sup>b</sup> mod p	В
	$K = g^{ab} mod p$	
	E <sub>K</sub> (A, proof I'm A)	
	E <sub>K</sub> (B, proof I'm B)	

## Phase 1 Key Types

- pre-shared secret key
- public encryption key pair
- public signature key pair
- two variants of public key
- each key variant used in main and aggressive mode
- 8 variants of Phase 1 IKE

## Proof of Identity

- Intended to show that sender knows preshared secret or private signature key
- Proof is Hash (key, Diffie-Hellman values, names, crypto choices and cookies)
- Different proofs for different key variants


# **Negotiating Crypto Parameters**

- A proposes suite of algorithms
- B chooses
- Encryption (DES, 3DES, IDEA)
- Hash (MD5, SHA-1)
- Authentication (private key MAC, RSA, DSS)

# Session Keys

- Phase 1 establishes session key for integrity and session key for encryption
- Keys used for last Phase 1 IKE message and all Phase 2 IKE messages
- Keys are hashes of Diffie-Hellman numbers, names, cookies and long-term secrets

#### Phase 2 IKE: Establishing IPSec Security Associations



# Phase 2 IKE

- X pair of cookies generated in Phase 1
- Y- 32-bit number unique to Phase 2 session set up
- CP crypto parameters proposed and accepted
- traffic description of trtaffic (IP address pair, ports allocated, protocols allowed